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Gang Mt Agley 
by Carl E. Schneider 
The amount of law is relatively small 
which a modern legis!dture can successfully 
impose. The reason for this is that unless 
the enforcement of the !dw is taken in 
hand by the citizenry, the officials as such 
are quite helpless . ... For what gives !dw 
reality is not that it is commanded by the 
sovereign but that it brings the organized 
force of the state to the aid of those citizens 
who believe in the !dw. 
-Walter Lippmann 
A Preface to Morals 
I n my last contribution to this col-umn (HCR, July-August 2000), I ar-
gued that the law of bioethics has re-
peatedly failed to achieve the hopes 
cherished for it. I presented evidence, 
for example, that most doctors breach 
the duty of informed consent, that ad-
vance directives do not direct patients' 
care, and that repeated legal attempts to 
increase organ donation have failed to 
find the success predicted for them. I 
closed that column by promising to try 
to explain this chastening experience. 
It would, of course, take a lifetime of 
columns to capture all the reasons the 
law of bioethics has so often disappoint-
ed. 1 Here I want to discuss only one, al-
beit a crucial one: Legal regulation of 
human behavior is insistently difficult 
because human behavior and social in-
stitutions are bafflingly complex. It is 
maddeningly hard to mold that behav-
ior and those institutions because they 
are shaped by many potent forces be-
sides the law and because lawmakers so 
often cannot accurately identifY all those 
forces and devise reliable methods of al-
tering enough of them in sufficiently 
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precise and predictable ways to achieve 
the result intended. It is even hard for 
law to rule in its own house-for exam-
ple, to shape litigation in useful ways. 
The law of bioethics illustrates both the 
general problem (influencing social be-
havior) and its particular instantiation 
(influencing legal institutions). Let me 
once again adduce empirical evidence to 
show how. 
Living wills exemplifY the first prob-
lem. Living wills seemed an obvious so-
lution to the perplexity of making end 
of life decisions for incompetent pa-
tients, but they have betrayed the expec-
tations faithfully nurtured for them. To 
see why, consider the chain of circum-
stances necessary for living wills to be 
well and widely used. 
First, people must want a living will. 
Some people say they do not, many of 
them because they think satisfactory de-
cisions will be made for them without 
one. Many people believe they want a 
living will, but very many of these have 
not signed one even though they know 
about advance directives. Programs to 
persuade people to sign living wills have 
not been conspicuously successful. Is 
this, perhaps, because people do not ac-
tually want them, or do not actually 
want them enough to overcome ambiva-
lence about them? 
Second, people must know what 
treatment they would want should they 
become incompetent. This requirement 
has several components. To begin with, 
people must (a) obtain accurate infor-
mation about what their choices would 
be and (b) understand that information. 
But patients will encounter all the prob-
!ems acquiring and analyzing informa-
tion that have become notorious 
through studies of informed consent. 
And empirical investigation suggests 
that doctors are neither anxious to have 
conversations about living wills nor 
adept at conducting them. 2 Further-
more, unless people are assisted with ex-
ceptional care, they must decipher the 
advance directive itself. This is no small 
undertaking. Living wills are often exe-
crably drafted. And even if they were 
drafted by angels, "[i]n the largest study 
of functional health literacy in the Unit-
ed States, . . . 42% of . . . [English-
speaking patients] were unable to com-
prehend directions for taking medica-
tion on an empty stomach, 26% could 
not understand information on an ap-
pointment slip, and 60% could not un-
derstand a standard consent form."3 In 
addition, people preparing advance di-
rectives not only confront all the per-
plexities of medical decisions; they also 
face the special problems of making de-
cisions for a hypothetical future. They 
must imagine what they would want at 
an unspecifiable time stricken with an 
unidentifiable illness with unpredictable 
treatments. 
People who have come this far must, 
third, put their choices into words. This 
riddle has received considerable, pained, 
attention. The first generation of living 
wills spoke in egregiously broad terms; 
the second generation reacted with 
heroic attempts at specificity; and the 
third generation has essayed such de-
vices as "values histories," recklessly 
flouting Oliver Wendell Holmes's wise 
warning that "general principles do not 
decide concrete cases." My own experi-
ence is that patients cannot tell you 
what their living wills actually say, and 
more systematic students conclude, for 
example, that their "observations raise 
serious questions about the patient's un-
derstanding of the general statement in 
the California directive and suggest that 
such brief expressions cannot be taken as 
exact instructions."4 
Fourth, the living wills patients write 
must be available to the people making 
the medical decisions. Ordinarily, this 
means living wills must leave the 
lawyer's or doctor's office, follow pa-
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tients in their pilgrimage through the 
health care system, and enter patients' 
charts in sufficiently obvious ways that 
they are noticed. We thus find studies 
reporting, for example, that in 74 per-
cent of the admissions examined, "the 
advance directive was not recognized, 
nor was there written documentation of 
any attempts to discern if an advance di-
rective had been previously executed."5 
Fifth, the people making decisions 
for incompetent patients must compre-
hend and obey the living will's instruc-
tions. The challenges this requirement 
presents are suggested by the study that 
found that "[e]ven with the therapy-spe-
cific A[dvance] D[irective] accompanied 
by designation of a proxy and prior pa-
tient-physician discussion, the propor-
tion of physicians who were willing to 
withhold therapies was quite variable."6 
Another study determined that "the ex-
istence of an advance directive that lim-
its the therapeutic maneuvers to be car-
ried out after the patient becomes un-
able to make his or her own healthcare 
decisions do [sic] not influence the level 
of medical care overall. "7 As another 
study explained, there is "a complex in-
teraction of the following three themes: 
patients were not seen as 'absolutely, 
hopelessly ill,' and thus, it was never 
considered the time to invoke the AD; 
the contents of ADs were vague and dif-
ficult to apply to current clinical situa-
tions; and family members or the surro-
gate designated in a [durable power of 
attorney] were not available, were inef-
fectual, or were overwhelmed with their 
own concerns and did not effectively ad-
vocate for the patient."B 
In sum, failures confound every step 
along the path toward a successful 
regime of advance directives and show 
how challenging it can be for the law to 
affect behavior even in apparently sim-
ple and desirable ways. The similarly 
perilous path to a law of informed con-
sent with bite indicates that the law can 
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hardly make even its own institutions 
work as intended. The law gives doctors 
an incentive to inform their patients 
properly by offering patients a legal rem-
edy-money damages-if physicians 
fail in their duty. But observe again how 
many steps lie between the injury and 
the remedy. First, patients must realize 
both that they have not been informed 
as the law requires and that they have 
legal recourse. Then they must decide to 
sue. We may be a litigious society, but 
even people who have actually been in-
jured often decline to pursue legal reme-
dies. For example, "only a small fraction 
of persons with a valid [medical mal-
practice] claim actually file a suit."9 
Having decided to sue, patients must 
find a lawyer. 
But this is the easy part. Lawyers or-
dinarily ask three questions: Did the 
doctor's failure to inform the patient 
cause some physical injury? Would the 
ordinary patient have chosen a treat-
ment differently if properly informed? 
Was the injury great enough and is the 
evidence dear enough to make it worth 
my while litigating the case? To at least 
one of these questions, the answer is 
usually "no." Even if the answer to each 
is "yes," patient and lawyer must perse-
vere over the many years suits last. The 
court must accurately evaluate the doc-
tor's liability and the patient's damages. 
Finally, doctors must extract the correct 
lessons from the law's workings: they 
must learn when information is required 
and that withholding it exacts appropri-
ately measured costs. 
In short, the law of bioethics disap-
points partly because it is truly difficult 
to affect human behavior. Not only is 
life elaborately complex. People's prefer-
ences and behavior are principally 
shaped by the norms and institutions in 
which they are embedded. The law can 
wheel its cumbersome and rickety ma-
chinery into place only laboriously and 
sporadically. Small wonder that law gen-
erally, and not just the law of bioethics, 
repeatedly teaches us that "[t]he amount 
of law is relatively small which a modern 
legislature can successfully impose." 
But I do not counsel despair. Law's 
policies can be devised badly or well. In 
a later column I will discuss some of the 
reasons lawmakers seem so often to have 
written the law of bioethics ineptly. 
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